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Comprehensive review of the post structure of the United Nations Secretariat

Report of the Secretary-General*

Summary

The General Assembly, in its resolution 54/249 of 23 December 1999, requested the Secretary-General to undertake a comprehensive review of the post structure of the Secretariat, taking into account, inter alia, the introduction of new technology, and to make proposals in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003 to address the top-heavy post structure of the Organization. The post structure was reviewed in the context of the preparation of the proposed programme budget and the results were presented in paragraphs 19 to 30 of the Introduction to that document. In its resolution 56/253 of 24 December 2001, the General Assembly noted with concern that the requested comprehensive review had not been submitted, and reiterated that the review be submitted to it at its fifty-seventh session.

The present report presents the main findings of the review. The main conclusion that could be drawn from the review is that, from the point of both internal and external comparisons, the current post structure and distribution of posts in the Secretariat does not indicate any apparent anomalies that could be characterized as top-heaviness of the Secretariat structure vis-à-vis comparative post structures in other major international organizations.

The issue of the post structure of the Secretariat will be kept under review and reported to the General Assembly in the context of the biennial programme budgets, as appropriate. The General Assembly may wish to take note of the present report.

* Submission of the report was delayed because of the need to obtain input from a number of national and international organizations.

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I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution 54/249 of 23 December 1999, requested the Secretary-General to undertake a comprehensive review of the post structure of the Secretariat, taking into account, inter alia, the introduction of new technology, and to make proposals in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003 to address the top-heavy post structure of the Organization. The post structure was reviewed in the context of the preparation of the proposed programme budget and the results were presented in paragraphs 19 to 30 of the Introduction. In its resolution 56/253 of 24 December 2001, the General Assembly noted with concern that the comprehensive review had not been submitted, and reiterated that the review be submitted to it at its fifty-seventh session.

2. In response to that request, and in conjunction with the Secretary-General's programme for the strengthening of the Organization, a comprehensive review of the post structure of the United Nations Secretariat was conducted with the assistance of a consultant. A summary of the review undertaken and the key findings of the review are contained in the present report.

II. Rationale and general approach

3. The review was prompted by the General Assembly's concerns about top-heaviness in the United Nations Secretariat. In response to those concerns, the Secretary-General included a review of the post structure in his action plan for the strengthening of the Organization. The Office of Human Resources Management was directed to oversee the review under the auspices of the Deputy Secretary-General. The first step was to test and validate the assumptions of top-heaviness and identify reasons and justifications for any imbalances.

4. There is no single, generally accepted definition or quantitative measure of top-heaviness. Different organizations have different structural needs, depending on their missions, functions, governing structures, cultures, policies and practices. Therefore the approach taken was to consider the issue from four perspectives: (a) internal comparisons over time and across departments; (b) external comparisons with comparable organizations; (c) general organizational measures as reported in management literature; and (d) the impact and effectiveness of current post control mechanisms.

III. Objective, scope and methodology

5. The objective of the review was to provide the data, information and analysis needed to assess the balance and appropriateness of the current United Nations post structure and to identify any further action required. It was neither a comprehensive organizational analysis at the departmental level, nor a review of job classification.

6. The focus of the review was on the D-1 level and above, although statistics for other levels were provided for perspective. The study covered posts at the Secretariat in New York and at the United Nations offices at Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi. Posts funded through the peacekeeping support account were included, but

not military or civilian posts assigned to specific peacekeeping missions. The methodology included:

(a) Extraction of relevant statistics from budget documents prepared by the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts and from reports produced by the Office of Human Resources Management;

(b) Interviews with the Deputy Secretary-General and officials in the Office of Human Resources Management and the Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts;

(c) Design and conduct of a brief survey of selected international organizations and governmental ministries;

(d) Review of various documents and reports of the General Assembly, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the International Civil Service Commission and departments of the Secretariat;

(e) Review of current literature on organizational theory.

Survey participants were selected on the basis of comparability of programmes and scope of activities, but with the understanding that equivalencies were inexact and subjective. The primary measure for both internal and external comparisons was the number of posts at D-1 level and above as a percentage of total posts.

IV. Major findings

A. Internal analysis

7. Viewed in isolation, the current post structure contains no bulges or anomalies in the pyramid that immediately suggest top-heaviness. The distribution of posts by department is generally consistent with the expectation that policy-making and representational functions require more high-level posts than do administrative and support functions. Viewed over a ten-year time frame (1992-2002), only the USG/ASG level has grown significantly — a net of nine posts. Eight were either new posts or conversions, generally the result of new programmes and changing priorities, three were reclassifications of existing D-2 posts, and two were abolished. Director (D-2/D-1) level posts from combined sources have decreased by 42 over the ten-year period, largely as a result of the restructuring and downsizing undertaken in the biennium 1998-1999. Differences between New York and other locations reflect the concentration at Headquarters of policy-making and common system responsibilities.

B. External analysis

8. The following international organizations participated in the survey conducted by the Secretariat to determine if the percentage of management posts at the Secretariat was significantly higher than in comparable organizations: Asian Development Bank, World Bank, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and European Commission. Information pertaining to other organizations in the United Nations system that was available in publications was also used. In addition, an attempt was made to gather data from specific

governmental ministries in order to facilitate comparisons with some of the major Secretariat departments.

9. The international organizations were viewed as having comparable policy-making responsibilities and relatively broad mandates. While there are no assurances that the organizations are properly structured, this is the closest that one could get to benchmark data for purposes of comparison. However, as with all comparisons, there are limitations to the conclusions that can be drawn.

10. Comparability was determined using sample job descriptions or brief grade level definitions provided by the participant. Broad categories of responsibility and hierarchy were used to encompass several grade levels and to permit reasonable comparability under commonly understood headings.

11. In general, the results of the survey were positive. The Secretariat has a lower percentage of posts at the D-1 level and above (3.4 per cent) than the Asian Development Bank (5.6 per cent) and the European Commission (3.8 per cent), but higher than the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2.9 per cent). Equivalency to the D-1 level could not be established with the World Bank because of its broadbanded pay grades. However, a comparison of regular budgetary posts at the P-5 equivalent and above in the two organizations showed the Secretariat to have a much smaller percentage of posts at those levels than did the Bank (11.9 per cent versus 18.9 per cent). A comparison with the grade distributions of major organizations of the United Nations system (the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund, the International Labour Organization, the World Health Organization and the International Atomic Energy Agency) showed the Secretariat to have a smaller percentage of management posts than any of the other United Nations organizations, except the International Atomic Energy Agency.

C. Organizational theory and standard measures

12. The broad mandate and policy-making focus of the United Nations make it difficult to apply such traditional standards as organizational layers and span of control, but these measures can still be useful indicators and informal targets in assessment and reform processes. Management literature reports an average of seven layers from top to bottom in large organizations, public and corporate, with five layers in the leanest organizations. It was not possible in the context of the present study to determine average layers for the Secretariat, but it would be an instructive exercise for managers. A structure with six layers would seem to be a useful target.

13. The literature reports a continuing trend towards wider spans of control. A ratio of 1:15 (one supervisor for every 15 staff) was established as a target for the United States Federal Government, compared to a 1:7 average span of control at the time that the study was undertaken. Based on an approximate calculation, the overall span of control for the Secretariat is approximately 1:10 for the regular budget and 1:12 for combined funding sources.

D. Organization and post controls

14. Brief interviews and the review of pertinent management reports suggested problems in several areas, including: (a) continuing pressures for classification upgrades; (b) lack of organizational guidelines and review processes; and (c) a microlevel budget approval process. The Office of Human Resources Management is considering, and in some cases already implementing, steps to reduce classification pressures and enhance and clarify promotional opportunities, and to establish a career development programme, generic job profiles, career bands, and managed mobility and rotation. (The European Commission has a particularly stringent mobility requirement for senior management.) As the emphasis shifts from job classification to career development, post control mechanisms may also need to change in order to prevent abuse and undue pressures on the promotion processes. Several member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development as well as United Nations organizations are decentralizing budget responsibilities so as to promote both flexibility and managerial self-discipline.

15. There is no clear responsibility or formal guidelines for organizational review. Decisions on new posts and reclassifications are often made in isolation rather than in the broader context of organizational standards and integrity. The Compensation and Classification Policy Unit generally does not have the guidelines or authority to question new layers of management. In the report of the Secretary-General on human resources management reform, new responsibility is proposed for the Department of Management in monitoring both budgetary and human resource activities, which should include adherence to organizational guidelines and targets.

16. The role of the Fifth Committee and the General Assembly in reviewing and approving new Professional posts and reclassifications individually as part of the budgetary process could be a factor contributing to the lack of a strategic focus in such a process. A more common approach is for governing bodies to monitor grade distribution and enforce post controls based on more global measures, such as percentages and ratios, rather than on individual actions in respect of posts.

V. Conclusions

17. While it was neither intended nor possible in the study to make a final pronouncement on the issue of top-heaviness in the Secretariat, the main conclusion that could be drawn from the review confirms that the current post structure and post distribution in the Secretariat does not indicate any apparent anomalies that could be characterized as top-heaviness when comparing the post structure and distribution statistics of the Secretariat with similar data of other international organizations. At the same time, the Secretary-General noted that, because of methodological issues, the review of the post structure in comparison with other international organizations was complicated. There was no single measure or generally accepted grade distribution that would provide a template for such an assessment. Also, there were no general theories of organizational design of practical application that could be relevant to the United Nations, bearing in mind its broad mandate and policy-making focus.

18. Another conclusion that was drawn from the review is that the Secretariat's post control mechanisms are working in the sense that new posts and upgrades are

limited. However, it was observed that there is a reliance on high-level restraint, for example, the Fifth Committee, rather than managerial self-discipline and accountability. The process itself creates tensions and frustrations that may have prompted some of the assumptions and concerns about top-heaviness that led to the present study.

19. The ongoing human resources reform effort should help to mitigate some of the pressures on job classification and, if combined with organizational guidelines and post control reforms, could help to reduce concerns about grade creep and top-heaviness in the structure.

20. The above conclusions are in line with the view of the Secretary-General, as outlined in his report on the strengthening of the United Nations (A/57/387 and Corr.1), that there is a need for an efficient, flexible system for allocating adequate resources to the Organization's priorities. In this context, the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2004-2005 will take these issues into account so as to ensure that resources are allocated to programme priorities.

21. Clearly defined responsibilities, authorities, managerial accountabilities and review mechanisms are necessary in the delegation of authority to programme managers, a process which is at the centre of the Secretary-General's reform initiatives. At the same time, the Department of Management has a central role in ensuring that common organizational principles and policies are observed throughout the Secretariat and that the exercise of delegated authority is discharged within agreed guidelines, procedures and rules. As regards job classification reform, the International Civil Service Commission has proposed a number of innovations which would shift the emphasis towards more flexible recognition of the changing nature of work, as well as towards competencies and career development. Concerning possible alternative approaches to post control, the Secretary-General notes that performance reports and the results-based format of the programme budget provide an opportunity to review managerial accountability and budgetary responsibility against the yardstick of availability of human and financial resources.

22. The Secretary-General intends to keep the issues of post structure and distribution of posts in the Secretariat under review and to report in that regard to the General Assembly in the context of his biennial programme budgets, as appropriate.

VI. Recommendation

23. **The General Assembly may wish to take note of the present report.**

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Human rights questions: human rights situations and reports of special rapporteurs and representatives

The human rights situation in Myanmar

Report of the Secretary-General*

Summary

The present report is based upon the good offices undertaken by the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy, Razali Ismail, to facilitate national reconciliation and democratization in Myanmar, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 56/231 of 24 December 2001. The discussions that the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy have had separately with the Myanmar authorities during the reporting period have focused on the issue of how the United Nations, which has been facilitating the confidence-building talks that started between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in October 2000, can be of assistance in moving these discussions towards a more substantive dialogue. Some significant developments have taken place, including the restoration of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of movement on 6 May. However, substantive dialogue between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has not started yet. Concerned that the positive momentum generated since this spring will be lost unless some tangible progress is made in the near future, the Secretary-General reiterates his call on the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to set aside their differences, unite for the larger cause of national reconciliation and start their political dialogue as soon as possible so that a national reconciliation acceptable to all interested parties in Myanmar can be achieved at an early date.

* The present report is being submitted on 16 October 2002 so as to include as much up-to-date information as possible.

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BEST COPY AVAILABLE

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 27 of General Assembly resolution 56/231 of 24 December 2001, entitled "Situation of human rights in Myanmar", in which the Assembly requested me to continue my discussions with the Government of Myanmar on the situation of human rights and the restoration of democracy in the country and to submit additional reports to the Assembly during its fifty-sixth session on the progress of those discussions, and to report to the Assembly at its fifty-seventh session and to the Commission on Human Rights at its fifty-eighth session.

2. As indicated in my previous reports, I consider the role entrusted to me by the General Assembly as being one of good offices, as opposed to the fact-finding mandate assigned by the Commission on Human Rights to the Special Rapporteur. In this context, the General Assembly, by resolution 56/231, strongly endorsed the efforts of my Special Envoy for Myanmar, Razali Ismail, to help facilitate national reconciliation among all interested parties in Myanmar and encouraged the Government of Myanmar, through the establishment of a constructive and regular dialogue, to make better use of my good offices.

3. In implementation of resolution 56/231, my Special Envoy has so far visited Myanmar twice in 2002, from 23 to 26 April and from 2 to 6 August. He had undertaken six missions during 2000 and 2001. My Special Envoy's primary interlocutors in Yangon from the Government side were Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, Secretary-1 of the State Peace and Development Council, Win Aung, Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Khin Maung Win, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Other Government officials with whom he had discussions included Tin Winn, Minister of Labour and Culture, Brigadier General D. O. Abel, Minister at the Office of the Chairman of the State Peace and Development Council, Colonel Tin Hlaing, Minister of Home Affairs, and Soe Tha, Minister of National Planning and Economic Development. During his April visit, my Special Envoy also met with Senior General Than Shwe and General Maung Aye, Chairman and Vice-Chairman respectively, of the State Peace and Development Council.

4. During each of his visits, my Special Envoy met separately with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, General Secretary of the National League for Democracy (NLD), and other members of the NLD Central Executive Committee, including Chairman Aung Shwe, Vice-Chairman Tin Oo and Spokesman Lwin. In addition, my Special Envoy met with representatives of the ethnic nationalities, including members of the United Nationalities Alliance, which comprises the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy and seven "de-registered" ethnic political parties. He also had useful exchanges of views with members of the diplomatic corps, the United Nations country team and international non-governmental organizations in Myanmar, including the International Committee of the Red Cross.

5. On my part, in view of developments in Myanmar in early 2002, I conveyed my thinking on the national reconciliation process in a letter addressed to Senior General Than Shwe, who is also Prime Minister of Myanmar, on 17 April 2002, ahead of my Special Envoy's visit. I continued my discussion with the Myanmar authorities when I met with Foreign Minister Win Aung during the present session of the General Assembly, on 20 September 2002.

II. Content of the discussions

6. The discussions that my Special Envoy and I have had separately with the Myanmar authorities over the past year have centred on the issue of how the United Nations, which has been facilitating the phase of the confidence-building talks that started between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in October 2000, can be of assistance in moving these discussions beyond the confidence-building stage to dialogue on more substantive issues. Over this period, and in this context, my Special Envoy and I have also focused on: (a) the need to release all political detainees; (b) the full lifting of the restrictions on the normal activities of legal political parties; (c) the provision of enhanced humanitarian assistance; and (d) the need for the Government to make adjustments to Myanmar's economy.

7. Some positive developments had taken place by the end of 2001. These included the continued release of political prisoners and the relaxation of some of the constraints on the lawful political activities of NLD and some of Myanmar's other legal political parties. Because of a better understanding between the two sides, confidence between them was judged to have increased as well. Hence, the sense that the time had come for the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to start a substantive dialogue was heightened in early 2002.

8. Hopes of a breakthrough diminished, however, following an apparent coup attempt in Yangon in early March and the subsequent postponement of my Special Envoy's trip to Myanmar, scheduled to take place in mid-March. In my letter of 17 April to Senior General Than Shwe, I pointed out that efforts to build confidence between the Government and NLD had been warmly received by the United Nations and the international community as a whole and urged the Prime Minister to take bold action to move the process forward, while recognizing the home-grown nature of the process. I reiterated the need for the remaining restrictions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of movement to be lifted so that she could fully resume her lawful activities as General Secretary of NLD. I also urged the Government to release the majority of the remaining political prisoners in the near future and eventually all of them.

9. My Special Envoy was able to return to Yangon in April. During his mission, he followed up on my thinking, at the highest level, with Senior General Than Shwe, General Maung Aye, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt and other senior Government officials. He stressed the importance of the Government lifting the remaining restrictions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of movement and entering a political dialogue with her as soon as possible. The Government leaders informed him of the scope of contacts between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and NLD. In addition, they assured him that despite the coup plot, they were not delaying their confidence-building talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, that the national reconciliation process was on track and that positive developments would come about in the near future. My Special Envoy left Yangon on 26 April, convinced that the Government would soon take some measures to restore Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of movement.

10. The remaining restrictions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of movement were lifted on 6 May. In its statement, the Government proclaimed that it would recommit itself to allowing all its citizens to participate freely in the political process. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi responded by remarking, "The confidence-building

stage is over". I welcomed this move as a major development that could provide fresh momentum to the 19-month-old confidence-building and national reconciliation process. The restoration of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's freedom of movement, as substantiated by her subsequent trips to Mandalay, Mon State and other regions, was warmly welcomed by the international community as a whole.

11. My Special Envoy continued his discussions with the Myanmar authorities on my behalf when he returned to Yangon in August. He reiterated the call for the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to start substantive dialogue by seizing the positive momentum generated since May. My Special Envoy impressed upon the Government that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was a "national asset", and urged it to begin to engage with her on a range of substantive issues. The Government acknowledged that the atmosphere surrounding its talks with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi had been "positive and sincere". Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt explained to my Special Envoy that the Government had given Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, during her trips to Mandalay and Mon State in late June, VIP treatment such as is normally extended only to State Peace and Development Council leaders. On the basis of the home-grown nature of the national reconciliation process, and in the spirit of what they referred to as "family reconciliation", the Government leaders indicated to my Special Envoy that they would soon meet with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to discuss a wide range of subjects, including, but not limited to, constitutional issues. However, the Government side stopped short of providing any time frame for such a process to start.

12. In addition, my Special Envoy reminded the Government that the release of political detainees was an important barometer of the national reconciliation process. He reiterated his call for the majority of the remaining detainees to be freed soon, and for all of the rest to be freed as soon as possible thereafter, preferably through an amnesty or a series of amnesties. He urged the Government to give priority to members of Parliament elected in the 1990 elections, as well as the elderly, the sick, women and those who have completed their sentences. Separately, my Special Envoy underscored the need for further freedom of activity to be restored to all of Myanmar's legitimate political parties. The Government's approach to the issue of political detainees is that it will release them in accordance with its national laws. Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt explained that because of the need to maintain national security and stability, the Government would continue to consider the release of political detainees on a case-by-case basis. The Government has so far released more than 330 NLD members since January 2001. Some 400 women prisoners have also been released on humanitarian grounds. Approximately 220 NLD members, 400 non-NLD members and several hundred others, including students, are nevertheless believed to be still in detention. Furthermore, I note with concern that since my Special Envoy's last visit to Myanmar, there have been credible reports of new political arrests.

13. The lifting of the restrictions on the activities of legal political parties has been unevenly applied. For example, while the office of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy in Yangon is open, its activities are limited in Shan State. As of August 2002, NLD had been allowed to reopen 60 township offices across the country: 37 in the Yangon district, 5 in Mon State and 18 others elsewhere, including Mandalay. However, despite numerous requests, it has not been granted a licence to publish. On the other hand, the National Unity Party, the pro-Government party that contested the 1990 elections, is allowed to publish and distribute political material.

14. During his separate meetings with the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, my Special Envoy discussed the possibility of greater United Nations and international humanitarian assistance to help Myanmar address challenges in the areas of HIV/AIDS, education and food security. He suggested that the Government establish a mechanism to administer and monitor the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Noting that there were adequate legal and administrative structures for the management of humanitarian assistance, the Government instead expressed its readiness to welcome specific recommendations that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would make on the basis of her future trips to various humanitarian project sites. The Government assured my Special Envoy that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi would have complete freedom to visit any project sites run by the United Nations, international non-governmental organizations and even the Government, if the two sides agreed on the visits beforehand. On her part, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi informed my Special Envoy that, as a consequence of her travel to Mandalay and Mon State, she was willing to "cooperate with the Government in ways that would directly benefit all the peoples of Myanmar and are conducive to the evolution of a democratic State". Separately, my Special Envoy raised the related issue of Myanmar's economy, and the need for adjustments to be made in parallel with the ongoing process of national reconciliation and democratization, with both the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

15. My Special Envoy made an effort to explain recent developments in the national reconciliation process to representatives of ethnic nationalities, whose eventual inclusion in the process is supported by the United Nations. He told them that the United Nations believes that substantive dialogue, leading to a national reconciliation acceptable to all the people of Myanmar, must eventually include all of the country's relevant political players, including representatives of the ethnic nationality groups. For their part, the ethnic nationality leaders have expressed their support for the ongoing talks and hope that they will be invited to take part in the national reconciliation process at an appropriate time. During his visit in August, my Special Envoy also encouraged the Government to investigate allegations that the Myanmar military had used rape as a weapon of war in areas of Shan State where conflict continues. I am pleased to note that the Government has invited the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar to visit the country in October. I am informed that during his visit, in addition to assessing the overall human rights situation in Myanmar, he will make a provisional assessment of how to proceed with an objective and comprehensive investigation of the recent rape allegations. I also welcome the recent appointment of an International Labour Organization liaison officer tasked with assisting the Government in its endeavour to eliminate the practice of forced labour in the country.

16. I continued my discussion with the Myanmar authorities on 20 September, taking advantage of Foreign Minister Win Aung's visit to New York for the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly. During my meeting with the Foreign Minister, I encouraged the Government to start its political dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as soon as possible. Emphasizing that all the political prisoners should eventually be released, I also urged the Government to implement a massive release of the remaining prisoners, which in my view would send a powerful message of its commitment to the national reconciliation process. I called on the Government to support the United Nations efforts for expanded assistance to address HIV/AIDS and other humanitarian issues facing Myanmar and, to that end, to fully cooperate with

the United Nations country team's programmes. Foreign Minister Win Aung assured me that his Government was committed to working to realize the people's aspiration to achieve a multiparty democratic system, but at the same time stressed the need to build a strong nation that could withstand any challenges to its territorial integrity.

III. Observations

17. **The national reconciliation process in Myanmar has reached a pivotal stage. Some significant developments have taken place over the past two years. However, it is five months since Daw Aung San Suu Kyi resumed her activities as the leader of a lawful political party, and, despite the indications given to my Special Envoy, substantive dialogue between the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi has yet to commence. I am concerned that the positive momentum generated since this spring could dissipate unless some tangible progress is made in the near future. It is my strong belief that the objectives of preserving stability and pressing ahead with much-needed reforms are mutually compatible. While recognizing the Government's desire to build a strong nation that can withstand challenges to its territorial integrity, history has proved that a system of governance is more stable and sustainable when it is flexible enough to accommodate diverse opinions and allow peaceful change. This is all the more necessary in the current international and regional environments, where rapid economic progress is accompanied by the requisite social change.**

18. **I appeal once again to Senior General Than Shwe, other leaders of the Government and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi to set aside their differences, to unite for the larger cause of national reconciliation and to commence substantive dialogue as soon as possible. It is only through an all-inclusive dialogue that Myanmar will be able to ensure that national reconciliation is durable and the transition to democracy smooth. I also reiterate my call on the Government to find ways to release quickly all the remaining political detainees and to relax evenly the remaining restrictions on the activities of the legal political parties. The people of Myanmar also need to begin to benefit directly from the process of national reconciliation and democratization currently under way in the country. I therefore urge the Government to cooperate with NLD and other legal political parties, the United Nations and relevant non-governmental organizations to ensure the effective and transparent distribution of humanitarian assistance. In addition, I encourage the Government to accept invitations from the international financial institutions to commence discussions on how to make certain necessary adjustments to the Myanmar economy.**

19. **I am very grateful for the support that interested Member States, both inside and outside the region, have provided me and my Special Envoy to facilitate the national reconciliation in Myanmar. Myanmar is not alone in its endeavour to achieve national reconciliation and democratization; the international community is genuine in its commitment to assist in the transition process. A stable, prosperous and democratic Myanmar is, after all, not only the aspiration of its own people but that of the international community as well. Myanmar should not hesitate to take advantage of the good will, advice and assistance offered by the United Nations and the international community. At the same time, I remind the Government of Myanmar that the longer it delays**

in realizing its commitment to enter a substantive dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the harder it will become for the international community to provide a framework within which the process of national reconciliation can move naturally towards its logical conclusion. In this context, I call on the international community to continue to respond appropriately and proportionately to developments in the national reconciliation process. On my part, I stand ready to continue to do my utmost in facilitating the process of national reconciliation in Myanmar, with the assistance of all interested Member States.

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Programme budget for the biennium 2002-2003

Standards of accommodation for air travel

Report of the Secretary-General*

Summary

The present report covers the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002, and is submitted in accordance with General Assembly decisions 44/442 of 21 December 1989 and 46/450 of 20 December 1991, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit annual reports on standards of accommodation for air travel. As also requested by the Assembly in its decision 40/455 of 18 December 1985 and section XIII of its resolution 45/248 A of 21 December 1990, respectively, information is included on expenditures by the United Nations for first-class air travel and relevant exceptions.

* This document could not be submitted by the established deadline owing to the need to receive information from various departments and offices pertaining to the travel year ended 30 June 2002.

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1. During the period under review, standards of accommodation for air travel were governed by General Assembly resolution 42/214 of 21 December 1987, in which the Assembly decided that all individuals, with the exception of the Secretary-General and the heads of delegations of the least developed countries to the regular and special sessions of the Assembly, whose travel was financed by United Nations organizations and programmes and who had been previously entitled to first-class accommodation, would be required to travel at the class immediately below first class. In the same resolution, the Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to exercise his discretion in making exceptions to allow first-class travel on a case-by-case basis.

I. Delegation travel

2. The General Assembly, in its resolution 42/214, limited the payment of first-class accommodation by air to one representative of each Member State designated as a least developed country attending the regular and special sessions of the Assembly. For the fifty-sixth session, for the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002, claims submitted to date involved 18 such journeys, at a cost of $114,195.

II. Exceptions authorized by the Secretary-General

3. As stated above, in General Assembly resolution 42/214, the Secretary-General was authorized to exercise his discretion in making exceptions to allow first-class air travel on a case-by-case basis. In addition, business-class travel by air may be authorized by the Secretary-General in certain circumstances, in accordance with administrative instruction ST/AI/2000/20 of 22 December 2000.

4. Generally, in reviewing cases that may warrant an exception, the Secretary-General takes into consideration the following circumstances:

(a) A medical condition may exist necessitating a level of comfort not available in the normal standard of accommodation to which the traveller is entitled. Such cases are referred to the Director of the Medical Services Division of the Secretariat for recommendation. It should be noted that the practice of granting exceptions in cases where a traveller is of an advanced age has been discontinued;

(b) The normal standard of accommodation is not available and, owing to the exigencies of the service, the traveller is required to travel on a particular date. Cases also arise where accommodation at the normal entitlement is not available and the cost of daily subsistence allowance, while waiting for the next available seat, would be greater than the higher standard of travel;

(c) The traveller is considered an eminent person, such as a former head of State, or a prominent international figure in political, humanitarian or cultural areas;

(d) The traveller is a prominent person who is donating his or her services free of charge to the Organization and, in some cases, at a loss of personal income. Such individuals may be accorded the standard of accommodation that they normally use when travelling;

(e) The traveller, after completing a full day of work, is required to travel through the night in order to resume work, attend meetings or present a paper at

another location on the following morning or immediately upon arrival. Where such cases involve arduous journeys, it has been deemed reasonable that the standard of accommodation accorded to the traveller should provide the best rest possible while travelling, or provide the conditions most conducive to work while flying, or both.

5. In respect of exceptions to air travel authorized during the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002 owing to the circumstances described in paragraph 4 above, the present report provides, in annexes I to V, detailed information on the additional cost of and reasons for such exceptions.

6. On 18 March 1998, the Secretary-General decided, as an exception, that all travel of the Deputy Secretary-General should be in first class, in keeping with her special status. As regards practical arrangements, efforts first are made to obtain upgrades to first class against payment of the full business-class fare. Where this is not feasible, the first-class fare is paid. During the reporting period, five such journeys were carried out, at a total additional cost of $12,412. Details of such travel are provided in annex VI to the present report.

7. To strengthen the ability of the President of the General Assembly to effectively and efficiently discharge the responsibilities of his Office, the General Assembly, in its resolution 52/214 of 18 December 1998, decided that the President, consistent with the approved programme budget, should have full authority to use the funds provided in the budget for the Office. Based on that authority, the President of the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session undertook travel in first class. During the reporting period, four such journeys were carried out, at a total additional cost of $27,277. Details of such travel are provided in annex VII to the present report.

8. Altogether, for travel during the period from 1 July 2001 to 30 June 2002, the Secretary-General exercised his discretion by authorizing, as an exception, 33 cases of first-class air travel. In addition, during the same period, the Secretary-General authorized business-class travel by air as an exception to the standards of accommodation in 43 cases.

9. It should be noted that, in accordance with the established practice to ensure personal safety, the Secretary-General was accompanied on all trips during the period under review by a personal aide/security officer who travelled by air in first class. The total additional cost of 11 such trips was $38,154.

10. While continuous administrative oversight has kept the number of exceptions at a minimum, it should be noted that in certain cases they are unavoidable. For example, exceptions owing to the lack of availability of regular standards are dictated by the exigencies of specific situations, and their number cannot therefore be kept constant or be forced to decrease without hampering the efficiency of the traveller's missions. Moreover, in many cases, to compel a traveller to wait until the established standard of travel becomes available would result in extra costs for the Organization for the daily subsistence allowance over and above the cost of an upgrade, an upgrade therefore remains the only cost-effective option.

11. In an effort to streamline the procedures for the granting of exceptions to the standards of accommodation for air travel, form TTS.3, "Request for exception to the standards of accommodation for air travel", was developed and made available on the United Nations Intranet during the period under review. Initial experience has

shown that efficiency gains have been achieved in administering requests for exceptions.

Table 1
Summary of exceptions, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002
(Cost in United States dollars)

	First class		*Business class*		*Total*	
Reasons for exceptions	*Number of trips*	*Additional cost*	*Number of trips*	*Additional cost*	*Number of trips*	*Additional cost*
Medical condition	4	11 856	15	17 335	19	29 191
Regular standard of accommodation not available	5	4 349	8	1 202	13	5 551
Eminent persons	9	16 942	13	5 897	22	22 839
Donating services free of charge to the Organization	7	33 830	2	4 083	9	37 913
Arduous journeys	1	2 727	5	7 335	6	10 062
Personal aide/security officer	11	38 154	0	0	11	38 154
Deputy Secretary-General	5	12 412	0	0	5	12 412
President of the General Assembly	4	27 277	0	0	4	27 277
Total	**46**	**147 547**	**43**	**35 852**	**89**	**183 399**

Table 2
Summary of exceptions, 1 July 2000-30 June 2001
(Cost in United States dollars)

	First class		*Business class*		*Total*	
Reasons for exceptions	*Number of trips*	*Additional cost*	*Number of trips*	*Additional cost*	*Number of trips*	*Additional cost*
Medical condition	5	8 707	12	18 381	17	27 088
Regular standard of accommodation not available	3	336	5	818	8	1 154
Eminent persons	8	11 980	12	23 898	20	35 782
Donating services free of charge to the Organization	7	15 705	0	0	7	15 705
Arduous journeys	0	0	1	292	1	292
Personal aide/security officer	11	37 559	0	0	11	37 559
Deputy Secretary-General	2	3 211	0	0	2	3 211
President of the General Assembly	1	4 300	0	0	1	4 300
Total	**37**	**81 798**	**30**	**43 389**	**67**	**125 091**

Annex I

Exceptions authorized owing to medical conditions, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002

Designation of traveller	*Itinerary*[a]	*Additional cost (United States dollars)*
A. First class		
1. Prosecutor, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	The Hague/New York/The Hague	2 119
2. Prosecutor, ICTY and ICTR	Lugano/Washington/New York/The Hague	2 336
3. Former Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on East Timor, invited by the Secretary-General to attend East Timor's independence	Tampa/Dili/Tampa	4 146
4. Prosecutor, ICTY and ICTR	Amsterdam/Zurich/Nairobi/ Zurich/Lugano	3 255
Subtotal		**11 856**
B. Business class		
1. Expert, Panel of Experts on Disability	Mexico City/New York/ Mexico City	950
2. Expert's assistant, Panel of Experts on Disability	Mexico City/New York/ Mexico City	950
3. Expert, Panel of Experts on Disability	Vancouver/New York/Vancouver	1 888
4. Expert's assistant, Panel of Experts on Disability	Zimbabwe/New York/Zimbabwe	1 888
5. Expert, Panel of Experts on Disability	Houston/New York/Houston	1 325
6. Expert's assistant, Panel of Experts on Disability	Houston/New York/Houston	1 325
7. Staff member, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)	New York/Geneva/New York	702
8. Staff member, OCHA	New York/Geneva/New York	702
9. Participant, Technical Group Meeting	London/Beirut/London	1 271
10. Staff member, Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services	New York/Madrid/New York	2 876
11. Civilian police officer, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	Pristina/Zurich/Bombay/Nagpur	1 406
12. Staff member, OCHA	New York/Geneva/New York	702
13. Staff member, Department of Economic and Social Affairs	New York/Paris/New York	714
14. Staff member, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	.../Sao Paulo/Rio de Janeiro/Santa Cruz/Lima/Quito/...	189
15. Staff member, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Geneva/Cairo/Geneva	447
Subtotal		**17 335**
Total		**29 191**

[a] The ellipses in a given itinerary indicate that some legs of the itinerary were by the regular standard of accommodation and no exception was involved.

Annex II

Exceptions authorized when the regular standard of accommodation was not available, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002

Designation of traveller	*Itinerary*[a]	*Additional cost (United States dollars)*
A. First class		
1. Staff member, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	Cairo/Doha/Beirut	120
2. Staff member, United Nations Institute for Training and Research	.../Abidjan/Freetown/...	112
3. Staff member, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP)	.../Los Angeles/Bangkok/...	3 357
4. Deputy Representative, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Khartoum/London/...	428
Subtotal		**4 017**
B. Business class		
1. Staff member, ESCAP	.../Paro/Bangkok	80
2. Participant, Seminar on codification, Union Économique et Monetaire Ouest Africaine: Automated systems for customs data	Niamey/Ouagadougou/ Niamey	46
3. Participant, ESCAP Meeting on development of Trans-Asian Railway Northern Corridor	.../Moscow/Vladivostok/...	247
4. Participant, ESCAP Meeting on development of Trans-Asian Railway Northern Corridor	.../Moscow/Vladivostok/...	247
5. Participant, ESCAP Meeting on development of Trans-Asian Railway Northern Corridor	.../Moscow/Vladivostok/...	342
6. Participant, ESCAP Thematic Working Group on Disability-related Concerns, and Campaign 2001 for the Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons	.../Dili/Denpasar/...	103
7. Participant, ESCAP Thematic Working Group on Disability-related Concerns, and Campaign 2001 for the Asian and Pacific Decade of Disabled Persons	.../Dili/Denpasar/...	103
8. Vice-Rector, United Nations University	Tokyo/Macau/Tokyo	34
Subtotal		**1 202**
Total		**5 219**

[a] The ellipses in a given itinerary indicate that some legs of the itinerary were by the regular standard of accommodation and no exception was involved.

Annex III

Exceptions authorized for eminent persons, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002

Designation of traveller	*Itinerary*	*Additional cost (United States dollars)*
A. First class		
Meeting of the high-level segment of the Economic and Social Council in Africa		
1. Prime Minister of Namibia	Windhoek/Geneva/Windhoek	1 472
Ministerial Meeting of the Tokyo International Conference on African Development		
2. President of Mali	Bamako/Tokyo/Bamako	1 146
Ad hoc expert group meetings on "Globalization and the State" and "Challenges and Changes in Public Administration around the World"		
3. Prime Minister of Uganda	Kampala/New York/Kampala	2 048
International Conference on e-Government for Development		
4. Prime Minister of Mozambique	Maputo/Palermo/Maputo	1 094
Fact-finding mission to Jenin pursuant to Security Council resolution 1405 (2002)		
5. Former President of Finland	New York/Geneva/Tel Aviv/New York	3 800
6. Former United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Geneva/Tel Aviv/New York	3 612
7. Head of the International Committee of the Red Cross	Geneva/Tel Aviv/New York	3 612
Secretary-General's Panel of Eminent Persons		
8. Former Prime Minister of Pakistan	Washington/New York/Washington	158
Subtotal		**16 942**
B. Business class		
Preparatory Meeting for the World Conference against Racism		
1. Former President of Finland	Helsinki/Geneva/Helsinki	0
2. Former Prime Minister of New Zealand	Auckland/Geneva/Auckland	0
3. Former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Australia	Brussels/Geneva/Brussels	108
4. President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union	New Delhi/Geneva/New Delhi	0
5. Former Director-General, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)	Malaga/Geneva/Malaga	104
6. Marseille Grand Mufti	Marseille/Geneva/Marseille	52
7. Cardinal, Vatican City	Rome/Geneva/Rome	41
Meeting on the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations organized by the Office of the Secretary-General		
8. Former Assistant Director-General for Culture, UNESCO	Mexico City/New York/Mexico City	1 062

Designation of traveller	*Itinerary*	*Additional cost (United States dollars)*
Meeting in preparation for the World Summit on Sustainable Development		
9. President of the Japan Institute of International Affairs	Tokyo/Bali/Singapore	532
To testify at the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia		
10. President of Kosovo	Pristina/The Hague/Pristina	900
11. Escort to the President of Kosovo	Pristina/The Hague/Pristina	900
12. Escort to the President of Kosovo	Pristina/The Hague/Pristina	900
13. Ambassador of Norway to the United States of America	.../Amsterdam/Washington	1 298
Subtotal		**5 897**
Total		**22 839**

Annex IV

Exceptions authorized for prominent persons donating their services free of charge to the Organization, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002

Designation of traveller	*Itinerary*	*Additional cost (United States dollars)*
A. First class		
World Conference against Racism		
1. UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador	New York/Durban/New York	3 401
2. UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador's wife	New York/Durban/New York	3 401
Unveiling of "Spirit of Audrey" Special Session on Children		
3. UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador	Monte Carlo/London/New York	5 839
4. UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador's wife	Monte Carlo/London/New York	5 839
5. UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador	Nice/Tokyo/Seoul/Los Angeles/New York/Nice	6 505
6. UNICEF Goodwill Ambassador's wife	Nice/Tokyo/Seoul/Los Angeles/New York/Nice	6 505
UNEP Sasakawa Environment Prize Award Ceremony		
7. H.M. Queen of Jordan	Amman/New York/Amman	2 340
Subtotal		**33 830**
B. Business class		
Second session of the United Nations Forum on Forests		
1. Chairman of the high-level ministerial segment	Bogota/New York/Bogota	607
External review group meeting (in connection with the Secretary-General's reform efforts)		
2. President of Amnesty International	London/New York/London	3 476
Subtotal		**4 083**
Total		**37 913**

Annex V

Exceptions authorized for cases involving arduous journey, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002

Designation of traveller	*Itinerary*[a]	*Additional cost (United States dollars)*
A. First class		
1. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan	.../Paris/New York	2 727
Subtotal		**2 727**
B. Business class		
1. Staff member, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)	New York/Paris/Geneva/London/ New York	2 233
2. Staff member, UNDP	New York/Stockholm/New York	2 418
3. Staff member, UNDP	New York/Brussels/New York	774
4. Staff member, UNDP	.../Helsinki/London/New York	1 320
5. President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia	.../Sarajevo/Paris	590
Subtotal		**7 335**
Total		**10 062**

[a] The ellipses in a given itinerary indicate that some legs of the itinerary were by the regular standard of accommodation and no exception was involved.

Annex VI

Exceptions relating to the travel of the Deputy Secretary-General, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002

Designation of traveller	*Itinerary*[a]	*Additional cost (United States dollars)*
A. First class		
1. Deputy Secretary-General	New York/Dili/New York	4 448
2. Deputy Secretary-General	New York/Turin/Montreal/...	110
3. Deputy Secretary-General	.../Geneva/Vienna/...	2 874
4. Deputy Secretary-General	New York/Brussels/Rome/Geneva/New York	2 984
5. Deputy Secretary-General	New York/Denver/San Francisco/New York	1 996
Total		**12 412**

[a] The ellipses in a given itinerary indicate that some legs of the itinerary were by the regular standard of accommodation and no exception was involved.

Annex VII

Exceptions relating to the travel of the President of the General Assembly, 1 July 2001-30 June 2002

Designation of traveller	*Itinerary*	*Additional cost (United States dollars)*
A. First class		
1. President of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly	New York/Oslo/Geneva/New York	7 551
2. President of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly	New York/Monterrey/New York	4 271
3. President of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly	Seoul/Madrid/Accra/Dakar/Seoul	6 594
4. President of the fifty-sixth session of the General Assembly	New York/Rome/Vienna/Prague/Seoul	8 861
Total		**27 277**

United Nations A/57/486

General Assembly

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Fifty-seventh session
Agenda item 147
Financing of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Proposed donation of assets to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the proposed donation of assets from the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina (A/57/449). During its consideration of the report, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information.

2. UNMIBH was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995. The Mission's mandate has been extended several times by the Council, the most recently in its resolution 1423 (2002) of 12 July 2002, by which the Council extended the mandate of the Mission to 31 December 2002.

3. The Advisory Committee notes from the report that the Mission has formulated a preliminary asset disposal plan based on the principles and policies approved by the General Assembly in section VII of its resolution 49/233 A of 23 December 1994 and resolution 52/1 B of 26 June 1998 (ibid., para. 2). The Committee also notes that, as at 22 July 2002, the assets of UNMIBH were established at approximately $58.8 million ($58,727,500), at their inventory value, to be disposed as follows: $7.1 million to be donated to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina; $32.6 million to be transferred to the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi; $127,500 to be sold to United Nations agencies; and $18.9 million to be written off or disposed of commercially.

4. The assets proposed to be donated to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina include ablution and accommodation units, light vehicles, communication and office equipment, data-processing equipment, generators and medical accommodation and equipment (ibid., para. 6).

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5. The action to be taken by the General Assembly is indicated in paragraph 7 of the report. **The Advisory Committee recommends that the Fifth Committee approve the proposed donation of assets with an inventory value of $7,103,200 to the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.**

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General Assembly
Security Council

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General Assembly
Fifty-seventh session
Agenda item 37

Security Council
Fifty-seventh year

The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security

Report of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report describes the ongoing work of the Transitional Administration to implement the Bonn Agreement. It focuses on a number of initiatives to enhance Government capacity, encourage private-sector growth and reform fiscal policy in order to allow the Government to gather revenues and to allocate and disburse them transparently and effectively. The Afghan Government's elaboration of a National Development Framework and Budget has been a key step in this process. The report also provides an update on the various commissions that are mandated by the Bonn Agreement (Civil Service Commission, Constitutional Commission, Human Rights Commission and Judicial Commission) as well as a number of other commissions created by President Karzai on his own initiative at the Loya Jirga.

The report further describes efforts by the international community to provide humanitarian assistance and to support the Afghan Government in reconstruction activities. Significant progress has been noted in the field of health (particularly immunizations), primary education and assistance to returnees (both refugees and internally displaced persons). The report also outlines efforts by the United Nations to support the Government as it defines priorities in the key sectors of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

A key impediment to implementation of the Bonn Agreement remains the deteriorating security climate. While efforts have been made to resolve conflicts between still-powerful leaders in some areas, a number of acts of terrorism and political violence have been perpetrated. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continues to effectively patrol Kabul, but more emphatic security measures by the international community are required beyond the capital. Notwithstanding this continuing need, efforts are ongoing to build and train a new Afghan army and police force, and to prepare for concomitant disarmament and demobilization of combatants who will not be recruited into State security structures.

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I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1401 (2002), adopted on 28 March 2002, and General Assembly resolution 56/220 A, adopted on 21 December 2001. It covers the period since the previous report on this item (A/56/1000-S/2002/737), issued on 11 July 2002.

II. Implementation of the Bonn Agreement: progress of the Transitional Administration

2. The Transitional Administration was established at the closing of the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 (see A/56/1000-S/2002/737, paras. 28-42) in accordance with the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (Bonn Agreement) (see S/2001/1154). The Administration, led by President Hamid Karzai, faces daunting tasks in the reconstruction of the country, the restoration of law and order, and the implementation of the remaining parts of the Bonn agenda, including the drafting and ratification of a new constitution and organization of general elections. Moreover, the Administration has to accomplish this in the context of a security climate that remains uncertain (see paras. 11-18 and 29-35 below).

3. During the reporting period, several key parts of the reform agenda announced by President Karzai at the Loya Jirga were set in motion. The President asserted the principle of civilian control over the armed forces by announcing that he was their Commander-in-Chief. A Defence Commission, with a broad representation of ethnicities, was established to work on the reform of the army. A National Security Council overseen by a National Security Adviser started to tackle the proliferation of local conflicts, sending out missions, along with representatives of the Cabinet, to resolve disputes in Herat and Mazar-i-Sharif.

4. The Government continues its efforts to extend its influence and control outside of Kabul. The Ministry of Finance has begun the vital work of bringing provincial government income under central government control. Progress was made when the Governor of Herat, Ismael Khan, remitted customs and passport revenues to the Government. The authorities in Balkh also submitted revenues to the central Government. Negotiations continue with other regional leaders to persuade them to remit to the Transitional Administration revenues collected in their areas. These revenues are often, in addition, the source of local conflicts. Besides reducing the incentive for conflict, the centralizing of revenue collection is a prerequisite of the effective functioning of the Afghan State.

5. The Transitional Administration's National Development Framework presents a vision of the State's role relative to the economy and society. The National Development Framework has three broad aims. The first is to use humanitarian assistance and social policy to create the necessary conditions for people to live secure lives and to thereby lay the foundations of human capital needed to support sustainable economic and social development. The second is to use external assistance to build the physical infrastructure and provide the basis for economic growth, led by the private sector, that can in turn support and build Afghanistan's human and social capital. The third is the creation of sustainable growth, so that a competitive private sector becomes an engine of growth and creates opportunity for

the population, thus serving also as an instrument of social inclusion. The success of this strategy depends on the ability of the State to implement it. To help the Government achieve this, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has been working with ministries to enhance their overall capacity.

6. The Transitional Administration has prepared a preliminary National Development Budget to implement the Framework. The budget was developed through a consultative process that involved the line ministries. The national budget is seen by the Government as its central instrument of policy, allowing it in particular to determine and monitor the development agenda. The budget for the current fiscal year (beginning in March 2002) amounts to $460 million. The Afghan Government expects to raise $60 million of this from its own resources. For the balance, the Government must rely on international donors through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) (see also para. 44 below).

7. The Transitional Administration has undertaken two ambitious initiatives to spur private sector growth, which is the keystone of its development strategy. First, the Administration enacted a private investment law to replace bureaucratic impediments that had reportedly frustrated a number of Afghan entrepreneurs. Second, the Administration has introduced a new Afghan currency (the "New Afghani"). A nationwide currency exchange exercise is under way to replace with the New Afghani the various currencies now circulating in the country. This is a courageous initiative, which, if successful, will reinforce the economic unity of the country and restore national and international confidence in the currency. It will also reduce transaction costs by reducing transaction risks.

8. In a further effort to promote fiscal reform, the Transitional Administration has hired reputable international companies to assist in procurement, financial management and auditing functions. The use of these firms should encourage transparency, accountability and efficiency, and curb corruption. This, in turn, should increase the confidence of donors and private sector investors in Afghanistan.

9. The Transitional Administration's attempts to fulfil its ambitious objectives have been stalled, however, by limitations in its ability to impose its authority nationwide. The intended policy of replacing the existing provincial governors, and heads of the provincial police, military garrisons, revenue offices and civil administrations with officials drawn from other provinces (see A/56/1000-S/2002/737, para. 39) has, in the majority of cases, not been realized. The Government has been unable to persuade factional leaders to move to Kabul. It has also not been able to enforce a decree that makes all armed groups allied to political factions illegal and orders their dissolution.

10. The Government seems to be succeeding in imposing its authority in some areas, however. Forces loyal to the Transitional Administration's Governor in Khost succeeded in dislodging fighters loyal to the faction leader Pacha Khan Zadran. Zadran had refused to recognize the Kabul-appointed governors of Paktya, Paktika and Khost provinces, and had attacked the city of Gardez several times, inflicting numerous casualties. It is also important to note that none of the remaining key factional leaders has opted out of the peace process, and some have made positive steps in building cooperation with the Government. However, the power of these leaders is not uniformly exercised in the name of the Transitional Administration, its authority and policies, or the interests of the people of Afghanistan as a whole.

11. The most serious challenge facing Afghanistan and Afghans today remains the lack of security; therefore, the most urgent national project remains the creation of security forces that are acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people. Reform of the security sector will provide Afghans with the tools to assure their own security and may also facilitate national reconciliation through the creation of a trusted national police and national army. It is now recognized by all that training of soldiers and policemen has to be complemented by comprehensive reform of these two institutions. A debate has at last begun about the future of the Afghan national army, and the Defence Commission is beginning to play the role it was created to play in the formation of the new armed forces. The lead nation on the reform of the armed forces, the United States of America, is working closely with the Afghans, UNAMA and the international community to secure an agreement between the central Government and the regional leaders on the future size, structure and deployment of the new Afghan armed forces. Related to this, it is vital that a clear plan for recruitment be defined to determine how those eligible for the new army will be phased in and others phased out. Numerous obstacles must be overcome before these objectives are met, including, above all, the need for consistent financial support. In order for the new army to become the national army of Afghanistan, rather than an additional army among many, existing private militias must be dismantled and their members demobilized and reintegrated into society. Japan and UNAMA are in the lead to design and implement a demobilization and reintegration plan as part of the process.

12. While the debate on the future shape of the national army is ongoing, efforts to train its soldiers continue. Three new battalions have graduated from training courses conducted by military personnel from the United States and France. However, the problems that existed when this training programme began have not yet been solved: there is a shortage of recruits, each battalion is only at half strength and the Ministry of Defence has said that it is unable to provide weapons, which have had to be imported. Furthermore, after the battalions graduate they are left with no clearly defined role and face difficulties finding suitable barracks, which must be specially renovated for their use. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) has started to run a training course to update the skills of the first battalion of the National Guard that it had originally trained earlier this year. This will ensure that a sense of purpose is nurtured and the number of personnel is maintained.

13. The lack of a unified and effective security structure means that Afghans continue to be exposed to intimidation, violence and crime. This negatively impacts all aspects of the peace process. It creates a vicious cycle in that many who express a wish to give up their weapons feel impelled to keep them so long as they experience insecurity.

14. The work of building a national army represents only part of the necessary security framework. Efforts to form a national police force need to be given added impetus as well. Germany, as lead nation for police reform, has begun to implement a programme to train and equip the police. This programme has made good progress. Eighty police trainers have so far been trained and have in turn begun training 1,549 police officers, including women. The one-year courses will be conducted at the Police Academy, newly refurbished by the German Police training project. The United States has generously pledged to start a training course for junior policemen and to train police trainers from the regions to conduct courses outside Kabul. France will also provide support to the Afghan police, supplying a drug laboratory

and equipment for those working in the anti-narcotics department in the Ministry of the Interior.

15. A one-week seminar held at the end of July at the Ministry of the Interior, allowed chiefs of police from across Afghanistan to define and agree upon a set of national objectives. However, police throughout the country remain woefully under-equipped and many outside Kabul have not been paid for months. The police are therefore unable to provide the basic services needed in the communities that they serve or to fill the security vacuum in so many parts of the country.

16. The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA) is beginning to cover the basic needs of the police in the Kabul region. This fund is being managed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in close cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior and UNAMA. Activities to be covered through the fund include the rehabilitation of police facilities, payment of salaries, training and capacity-building, and procurement of non-lethal equipment. It is hoped that sufficient resources will be provided to this Fund to allow funding activities to be expanded to other provinces soon.

17. The need to eradicate drugs remains one of the most pressing issues facing Afghanistan. Unfortunately, earlier momentum towards the definition of a comprehensive anti-narcotics strategy, including the provision of alternative livelihoods to poppy cultivation, has faltered. For a significant number of Afghans, poppy cultivation remains the only means to earn a livelihood. In the absence of viable economic alternatives, planting of next year's crop has already begun. The Afghan Government is working closely with the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) and the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States and Germany to develop and implement a counter-narcotics programme. ODCCP will assist in planning, coordinating and building administrative capacity for the programme. A drug control strategy is expected to be ready by late October for presentation at a consultation with relevant ministries and partners.

18. With regard to its international relations, the Transitional Administration has taken a number of measures to demonstrate its policy of responsible international citizenship. These include the signing of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (see CD/1478), concerted efforts against terrorism and, as mentioned above, a serious anti-narcotics campaign. President Karzai has striven to develop good relations with countries within the region, in particular with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. He has expressed his determination to strengthen mutually beneficial relationships with these important neighbours. As he stated to the high-level ad hoc meeting on Afghanistan, held in New York on 13 September 2002: "We extend a sincere hand of friendship to all our neighbours on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence." In this regard, I was pleased that during my meeting with President Karzai held at the general debate last September, he reiterated his desire for Afghanistan to resume its place as a responsible member of the international community.

III. Implementation of the Bonn Agreement: the commissions

19. The Bonn Agreement mandates the establishment of a number of commissions, including a Human Rights Commission, a Judicial Commission and a Constitutional Commission. The agreement also provides for the creation of additional commissions as necessary.

20. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) has been working on establishing its office and assuming its substantive responsibilities. Specific terms of reference have been assigned to each of the members in line with the Commission's programme of work. This programme will focus on investigation and monitoring, human rights education, the rights of women, and transitional justice. The Commission has already received petitions regarding alleged human rights violations and has begun to advise the Government on appropriate action. It has organized, jointly with UNAMA, fact-finding missions to several provinces to address human rights issues. Its members plan to cooperate closely in the future with the Constitutional and Judicial Commissions in order to ensure that human rights principles and standards are adequately reflected in the future constitution and in legal reforms. The Commission's United Nations-supported two-year programme was presented to donor countries both in Kabul and in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva. It is hoped that the strong support of the international community will soon be translated into actual funding of the Commission's activities.

21. The issue of transitional justice in particular was given a tragic yet urgent relevance by rep[illegible] f mass graves in northern Afghanistan. International media focused their int[illegible]on the Dasht-i-Leily site, near Shiberghan, which allegedly contained the remains of Taliban prisoners. In August, the three major political and military factions of the north in a joint public statement signed by General Dostum (Jumbish), General Atta (Jamiat) and Sardar Mohamad Sahidi (Wahadat Islami) declared their readiness to cooperate with investigations provided that these were carried out in an objective and impartial way. In their view, investigations should therefore also address those sites that allegedly contain the remains of people killed by the Taliban. UNAMA and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights are exploring the possibility of having several sites investigated by forensic experts simultaneously. In view of the volatile situation in the north, additional security guarantees will be needed. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission and UNAMA agree that the investigations should have a low publicity profile and, at the present juncture, be aimed primarily at finding and preserving evidence as well as, whenever possible, returning the remains to the families for a dignified burial. The present situation does not allow for systematic and full investigations of this and other human rights abuses of either the distant or recent past. There are currently no means of ensuring the security and protection of witnesses, and furthermore such investigations would seriously disrupt the fragile peace that the Government and international community are striving to foster and reinforce.

22. UNAMA human rights team has addressed over 40 cases of alleged serious human rights violations, including acts of intimidation suffered by leaders of political groups and civil society organizations. The situation is particularly serious in the central Hazarajat region, and the west and north-east parts of the country, where political and military leaders are trying to prevent any questioning of their

arbitrary rule. Specific ethnic groups, particularly the Pashtuns in the west and the north, have continued to be targeted and are victims of discrimination and violence.

23. The Mission is also looking into other possible patterns of violations: forced recruitment in the north by different armed factions; intimidation within government institutions; and conditions in prisons and private jails.

24. On 19 September 2002, under the auspices of the Ministry for Women's Affairs, UNAMA and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) jointly supported and facilitated a workshop of the Gender Programme Working Group, which included 60 national and international participants. The Working Group built mechanisms for coordination and collaboration between the various actors working in this field, and identified gender programmes for inclusion in the National Development Budget and the United Nations consolidated appeal. Following the positive experience with the Loya Jirga and the creation of the Loya Jirga network (see A/56/1000-S/2002/737, para. 37), UNAMA plans to further collaborate with the Ministry for Women's Affairs and the State Minister for Women's Affairs on a series of national and regional workshops to help prepare selected Afghan women for engagement and participation in the next elections, some as prospective candidates for political posts and the majority as electors. In relation to women's and girls' basic rights, there is cause for concern over the re-establishment at the central level of a Department of Islamic Teaching (*Irshad Islami*) reminiscent of the Taliban era Department of Vice and Virtue. As part of its function, the department has trained and deployed women to promote, in institutions and public places, strict behaviour for Afghan women, including restrictions with respect to their appearance and views.

25. To ensure the independence of the Judicial Commission, its membership is being reviewed. President Karzai has asked the Vice-President, Nematullah Shahrani, the Minister of Justice, Abdul Rahim Karimi, and UNAMA to assist in identifying suitable candidates. The lead nation for this sector, Italy, convened a G-8 donors conference on 17 and 18 September 2002 in Rome. A larger follow-up conference will take place from 19 to 21 December, also in Rome.

26. The Bonn Agreement calls on the Transitional Administration to prepare and conduct general elections within two years of the convening of the Emergency Loya Jirga (sect. I, para. 4). Parties to the agreement requested the United Nations to conduct a voter registration exercise in preparation for the election. In response to this request, members of the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat undertook a mission to Afghanistan in August to initiate discussions with relevant Afghan authorities and collect information in order to conduct a preliminary analysis of the requirements for an election. This inherently challenging task will be made even more difficult by logistic and security concerns as well as a lack of basic data. Also, an immediate step required to prepare for the elections will involve the establishment of an electoral management body, to organize and oversee the electoral process.

27. The Bonn Agreement also requires that a new census be conducted (annex III, para. 3 (ii)). Information from the census is needed for sound planning of the reconstruction process, which requires reliable population and development data. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) is working with Afghan authorities to prepare for this major undertaking.

28. An important responsibility facing the Transitional Administration is the drafting and ratification of a new constitution. According to the Bonn Agreement, a Constitutional Commission is to be formed within 2 months of the installation of the Transitional Administration, and a Constitutional Loya Jirga to adopt the constitution is to take place within 18 months of that date (sect. I, para. 6). In a modification of the letter of the Bonn Agreement that in no way violates its spirit, President Karzai has created a Constitutional Drafting Commission to prepare a first draft of the constitution. The full Constitutional Commission will be created in six months, once the drafting is complete. The full Commission will finalize and approve the draft that will be presented to the Constitutional Loya Jirga for ratification.

IV. Security

29. The period since the last report has seen a number of serious security incidents, adding to existing fears about overall security in Afghanistan. Attacks have taken place against members of the Transitional Administration and the international community, including the United Nations. These attacks suggest a renewed vitality and commitment on the part of those groups that are hostile to the peace process. They remain a source of serious concern. One day in particular, 5 September 2002, exposed the fragility of Afghanistan's security situation with devastating clarity. On that day, President Karzai narrowly escaped assassination in Kandahar and a major bomb exploded in the middle of Kabul killing more than 25 people. These events, occurring within hours of each other, were a brutal and vivid reminder that there are people intent on perpetuating the cycle of violence in Afghanistan. At the same time, these grave incidents represent a test of the international community's commitment to Afghanistan and must not be allowed to undermine the progress that has been made.

30. Across the country, skirmishes between rival factions still take place. No region of the country has escaped conflict. These conflicts prevent the delivery of aid, erode Afghans' confidence in the future and continue to cause human, social and infrastructural damage.

31. The United Nations itself has not escaped the violence. In late August, a small bomb was placed outside the United Nations guest house in Kabul, injuring two people when it exploded. A grenade was thrown into the compound of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) in Kandahar at the beginning of August, and it was extremely fortunate that there were no casualties. On 25 August, a guard was injured when two rockets hit the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) compound in Jalalabad, located near a coalition base.

32. The months following the convening of the Loya Jirga have seen an increase in terrorist incidents in the capital; there have been several rocket attacks and bomb explosions which, except for the attack on 5 September, have thankfully resulted in few damages and no casualties. The security situation in Kabul would undoubtedly be far worse were it not for the existence of ISAF under the command of Major General Hilmi Akin Zorlu of Turkey. The Force has played a crucial role in thwarting terrorist attacks and in protecting the government and people of Kabul. ISAF has been working with the Afghan security forces at improving cooperation and intelligence-sharing.

33. ISAF also responded positively to a request by President Karzai to assist the investigation into the assassination of Vice-President Haji Qadir on 6 July 2002. While those responsible for the assassination have still not been conclusively identified, ISAF assistance did result in stronger procedures for protecting members of the Transitional Administration, and a special training programme for bodyguards.

34. The western region continues to be relatively calm. In a positive effort to reduce tension between the Governor of Kandahar, Gul Agha, and the Governor of Herat, Ismael Khan, President Karzai proposed a meeting between the two leaders. General McNeill, commander of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, assisted in bringing the two leaders together.

35. While there has been a disturbing increase in the number of conflicts since the Loya Jirga, regional leaders, the Government and in some cases the belligerents themselves have worked to contain and put an end to the fighting. A case in point is the situation in the north where, after continued bouts of small-scale fighting during the period of this report, a more constructive approach has been adopted by the leaderships of the rival parties, Jumbish and Jamiat. Tensions around Mazar-i-Sharif appear to be abating somewhat after patient and persistent local-level diplomacy yielded increased cooperation between General Atta of Jamiat and General Dostum of Jumbish. In particular, an agreement to disarm the city was reached, and most of the city has been cleared of weapons. The two leaders announced that, in the future, there would be no place for commanders who fight for personal benefit. The intervention of the Joint Security Commission, which includes a representative of UNAMA, has also been successful in ending some low-level conflicts before they escalated or spread. The Commission has been busy working to resolve conflicts, setting up consultative shuras and working on the voluntary disarmament of districts where fighting has taken place. The United Nations, working with other members of the international community and local authorities, will continue to try to build on such progress and replicate it in other areas.

V. Humanitarian relief, recovery and reconstruction

36. During the period covered by this report, the Government of Afghanistan, the United Nations, non-governmental organizations and Afghan communities have been intensely involved in responding to the humanitarian crisis, addressing critical immediate needs. The focus has now shifted to a multifaceted response to rebuilding communities, responding to the many components of food insecurity, creating jobs, improving health care and expanding social services.

37. The United Nations is committed to fully supporting the Government of Afghanistan in implementing its National Development Framework and the corresponding budget process. In contrast with the previous year, the United Nations Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan for the period January 2003-March 2004 will be grounded in a Government-led process and in the Government's priorities for the next 18 months. The process was conducted through consultation with the Cabinet, and ministers were encouraged to establish their own vision and priorities, supported by the Programme secretariats.

38. A visible sign of progress in Afghanistan can be found in the successful campaign to get children back to school. A Government of Afghanistan/UNICEF

survey has confirmed that more than 3 million children have enrolled in 6,500 schools. Girls make up 30 per cent of total enrolment. Of the 70,000 teachers, almost one third are women. The challenge is now to keep these children in school, to rehabilitate existing school buildings, to build new schools where they do not currently exist (many classes are held, literally, under a tree) and to improve the quality of teaching, including ensuring the payment of teacher salaries. Secondary schools and Kabul University are also functioning again.

39. Another sign of progress is the massive return of refugees to Afghanistan. The voluntary repatriation operation, the largest in the world for 30 years, has witnessed the return of some 1.7 million refugees to Afghanistan from (mainly) Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Central Asian States. Of these, about 1 million have returned to Kabul and Nangarhar provinces, and some 300,000 to Parwan, Baghlan, Kunduz and Kandahar. The repatriation process is led and coordinated by the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in partnership with the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, and the Ministry of Urban Affairs. The challenge remains to assist returnees in rebuilding their lives and educating their children in the communities of return. More than 400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) have also returned to their areas of origin. In spite of these returns, real difficulties are still faced by other IDPs such as Pashtuns waiting to return to their homes in the north which they left to escape persecution, and Kuchis (nomads) deprived of their means of livelihood. Many others whose home provinces are still affected by drought also remain unable to return. Humanitarian assistance and protection activities will therefore continue to be required for these groups for at least another year.

40. In the food aid and food security sectors, the most recent 2002 FAO/World Food Programme (WFP) Crop and Food Supply Assessment survey suggests that cereal production has improved by over 80 per cent in areas that were cultivated. Limited rainfall and reduced overall cultivation, however, will still leave a substantial food deficit in some parts of the country. Food availability and access will remain most problematic in chronically vulnerable areas such as the central highlands, Badakshan and Ghor province, and in the southern provinces such as Kandahar, Zabul, Paktia and Khost where the drought continues. In addition to targeted food aid, there is a need for sustained investment in the agriculture sector. During the period from July to September 2002, food-for-work (FFW) projects employed an average of over 1 million per month. Owing to resource shortages, new food-for-work projects are being postponed until further contributions become available.

41. The prolonged drought in Afghanistan is having a devastating effect on the underground water resources in 13 provinces bordering Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkmenistan. A coordinated effort is taking place through the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, with the support of UNICEF and national and international non-governmental organizations, to provide new water sources and deepen dried-up wells for the affected population. During the present reporting period, a total of 55 sets of dug wells and hand pumps, 891 sets of bore wells and hand pumps, 217 bore wells, and 685 latrines have been provided to approximately 500,000 people in the drought-affected areas.

42. In the health sector, Afghanistan has made tremendous efforts to eradicate poliomyelitis and is well on the path to achieving that goal. Millions of children continue to be immunized through national immunization days. Some 6.3 million children between the ages of 6 months and 12 years (70 per cent of the target population) have been vaccinated against measles throughout Afghanistan. These efforts are led by the Ministry of Public Health with the support of the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and all major non-governmental organizations. An ongoing survey by the Ministry of Public Health, supported by the non-governmental organization Management Sciences for Health (MSH) and WHO, will assist in addressing access to health services in areas that lack them.

43. Preparations for the approaching winter continue under the leadership of the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development. The higher-than-expected return of refugees, and the risk of new displacements, remain of concern. There are some positive developments that will, it is hoped, help in responding to the specific dangers of winter. These include increased access to nearly all parts of the country, the flow of more money into the economy, the absence of large-scale conflict and an improved harvest. Under the leadership of the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, some 2 million people were identified as the most vulnerable in respect of their need of winter assistance, with a focus on the north, west and central highlands. Subject to the availability of resources, there is still time to expand cash-for-work schemes that target vulnerable groups and to meet the shortage in the food pipeline. With the approach of winter, there is being witnessed an outflow of people from Afghanistan to Pakistan, a trend also seen in previous years. The situation will continue to be monitored closely over the coming months.

44. On 22 July 2002, the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), jointly managed by the Asian Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, UNDP and the World Bank, succeeded the UNDP-managed Afghan Interim Authority Fund. ARTF covers the Government's recurrent budget, investment activities and programmes including quick-impact recovery projects, funding to support the participation of Afghan experts resident abroad in reconstruction efforts, and training programmes for Afghans. Contributions to date from donors have totalled some $81 million, with an additional $60 million expected. In early July, the Fund disbursed $18.5 million to the Government's account to cover urgent recurrent expenditure needs for July and August 2002.

45. There has been some initial progress in information management and dissemination; however, much more needs to be done. The Afghanistan Information Management System (AIMS) is now co-located with the Government and is supporting the Administration in developing national information, vulnerability analysis and nutrition surveillance systems, as well as tracking donor support and aid flows. These functions were previously performed by the United Nations itself, and thus it is noteworthy that they are now under the aegis of the Government.

46. As regards the mobilization of resources through the United Nations Immediate and Transitional Assistance Programme for the Afghan People 2002 (ITAP), $823 million has been committed since October 2001. Approximately $810 million has actually been disbursed in Afghanistan this year. A further $60 million in hard pledges is outstanding.

47. A meeting of the Implementation Group was held in Kabul on 12 and 13 October 2002. Chaired by the Ministry of Finance, the meeting included participants

from all sectors of the Government, United Nations agencies, non-government organizations and donors. It focused on a working draft of the National Development Budget presented by the Government, and also addressed humanitarian issues and coordination mechanisms for the donor community and development partners in Afghanistan. The draft national budget reflected a common set of priorities, articulated in a series of cross-cutting programmes including projects for education infrastructure, urban infrastructure, water resource investment, national governance infrastructure, and transport (major roads and airports), as well as a national solidarity programme. The budget will be finalized in the coming months through further consultations within the Government and with partners.

48. The Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA) continues to carry out survey, clearance and risk reduction education activities throughout the country, and has expanded its operations into many areas previously inaccessible owing to fighting. Over the past six months the number of Programme personnel has grown from 4,500 to over 7,000, and much of the equipment lost during recent conflicts has been replaced. This has resulted in the clearance of over 4,250,000 square metres of minefields and over 20,000,000 square metres of former battlefields, and the destruction of over 300,000 mines and unexploded ordnance during 2002. At the request of the Transitional Administration, the Programme has developed a strategy to enable the Government to meet the obligations of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer to Anti-personnel Mines and on Their Destruction to which it acceded on 11 September 2002. (I am pleased in this regard to note that the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Abdullah, presented the instrument of accession to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, in September.) This strategy will see all high-priority land cleared within five years, and all remaining land cleared in the following five. This will enable Afghanistan to fully comply with its treaty requirements, but will require constant donor funding if the objectives are to be achieved within this time frame.

VI. Mission support

49. Since the Loya Jirga, UNAMA mission support activities have focused on the assimilation of United Nations Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) personnel and equipment, and the consolidation of the premises, resources, and services utilized by UNAMA in Kabul and the regions. UNAMA and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat are cooperating on a complete inventory of all former UNOCHA assets as a preliminary to determining their distribution among eligible recipients. This effort will be completed by the end of October.

50. Priorities for mission support for the coming period include planning for the next major political milestones — the Constitutional Loya Jirga and the elections — and building capacity for Afghan staff to carry out UNAMA mission support activities. Integrated planning among the components of the mission is in progress to determine their support requirements through the end of December 2003. To enable as many Afghans as practicable to take over supporting functions and further reduce the United Nations footprint, suitable posts for conversion from international

staff to national staff are being identified. Simultaneously, technical and management training needs are being identified and developmental programmes implemented, to include English-language and computer literacy training.

51. At United Nations Headquarters, lead responsibility for UNAMA will shift at the beginning of November 2002 from the Department of Political Affairs to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in conformity with the provisions of my report entitled "Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change" (A/57/387), paras. 126-127. This shift has no implications beyond a rationalization of Secretariat functions as an integral aspect of the ongoing reform process. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations was involved in the management of UNAMA even while the Department of Political Affairs had the lead, and will continue to be very closely involved with Afghanistan, and specifically with UNAMA, after 1 November, particularly in providing policy guidance and expertise in electoral and constitutional matters.

VII. Observations

52. **As the first anniversary of the signing of the Bonn Agreement nears, the broad features of the peace process in Afghanistan become more perceptible and the challenges ahead come into starker relief. The political environment is difficult. The attacks referred to in this report show that adversaries of the peace process have not renounced the use of violence as an instrument to destabilize the Government and prevent the consolidation of peace. They are actively trying to take advantage of popular frustration with the pace of reconstruction, continued insecurity, and abuses by the local commanders which have re-emerged in the wake of the fall of the Taliban. This effort by extremist elements is not aimless. The collapse of law and order between 1992 and 1995 was a key factor behind the Taliban's military successes in subsequent years.**

53. **In order to confront these threats, the leadership of Afghanistan, with the support of the international community have several tools at their disposal. One is reconstruction. The reconstruction of the physical, economic and social infrastructure of Afghanistan is critical to the viability of the peace process. The creation of jobs and new economic opportunities is needed to restore hope and confidence within the population at large. It is also needed to meet short-term goals of the peace process such as the resettlement of refugees and displaced people, demobilization and disarmament of soldiers and ex-combatants and control of the expanding poppy cultivation. In regard to the last-mentioned, I would urge the international community and the Government of Afghanistan to work together to implement a strategy that will combine eradication and surveillance with viable economic alternatives. The enormous task of reconstruction places a heavy burden on the Transitional Administration. To meet the challenge, the Administration will need to increase its effectiveness at national and sub-national levels and expand its resource base. The international community has an important role to play in assisting the Government. UNAMA and the United Nations system will therefore continue to give priority to strengthening the capacity of the Transitional Administration.**

54. The Afghan Government and UNAMA are working together to accelerate the achievement of government capacity, to decentralize assistance and to develop subnational programmes tailored to the needs of individual provinces, and to ensure a more integrated and cost-effective contribution by the United Nations. The national authorities, with the support of the United Nations and other partners, are assuming an increasingly central role in the coordination of assistance. A number of United Nations personnel have been attached to government offices to support the administration in formulating its policies and activities. In the coming months, this support should be further refined, in consultation with the Government, with an overall capacity-building plan that focuses on civil service reform, and the increasing decentralization of United Nations assistance, integrated at the provincial level.

55. Notwithstanding these signs of progress, the Government, regrettably, remains very much under-resourced. The total needs of a country recovering from over two decades of conflict, destruction and drought outstrip even the $1.8 billion generously pledged at the donor conference held in Tokyo on 21 and 22 January 2002 (see A/56/801-S/2002/134, annex, para. 15).

56. One of the most visible signs of hope in Afghanistan is also a factor productive of great stress on the fragile economy and on Afghanistan's ability to recover. I refer to the expectedly large number of refugee returns. I join the Government and people of Afghanistan in expressing once again our gratitude to the Governments of those countries that, for many years, have generously hosted Afghan refugees. Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran have borne most of this heavy burden and their hospitality deserves to be recognized once again. We appeal to them to be patient and to show further understanding towards their neighbour, Afghanistan, as it struggles to take the necessary measures to absorb its returnees.

57. Improved security is a precondition for a successful reconstruction effort. Local militias prevent civilian administrators from fulfilling their tasks, extort tribute from farmers and businessmen and engage in factional fighting which displaces the local population and creates an environment where human rights are easily abused. The creation of national security forces — both army and police — and the strengthening of the justice system are key to the restoration of law and order. The international community has made a commitment to help with the establishment of these new security and law and order institutions; but the success of that undertaking depends first and foremost on the commitment of the major factions that have established a military presence extending over various parts of the country. It is primarily their responsibility to set aside short-term factional interests, prevent the existing divisions among them from driving the country again into lawlessness, and enable the country instead to equip itself with effective, unified national forces. Needless to say, the restoration of security also depends on international assistance. I therefore urge the international community to support this vital sector, the reform and development of which has the potential to provide Afghans with their fundamental right to security.

58. In the short term, the international community, working with Afghan counterparts, can take measures to effectively improve security conditions. Nowhere has this been more concretely demonstrated than in Kabul, where

ISAF patrols regularly and with excellent results. I continue to believe that an expansion of ISAF is the best available instrument to improve security across Afghanistan. Afghans from all regions and all walks of life continue to request this. As my Special Representative informed the Security Council in July: "The expansion of ISAF would have an enormous impact on security and could be achieved with relatively few troops, at relatively little cost, and with little danger to those troops."

59. **This leads to the political dimension of the peace agenda. A primary goal of the Bonn process was the establishment of a fully representative government. The Emergency Loya Jirga and the establishment of the Transitional Administration have addressed some of the shortcomings of the Interim Administration from the point of view of representation; and the 2004 elections are expected to provide an opportunity to complete that process. In the meantime, however, distrust continues to affect the relationship between the central Government and sectors of the population that perceive themselves as disenfranchised under the current dispensation. This estrangement from the political process is of particular concern among Pashtuns, both in the north and in the south. More broadly, it is a fact that the task of political reconstruction of the country has been made more difficult by the legacy of deepened ethnic fractures left by the 10-year civil war. Here, too, it is incumbent upon Afghan leaders, within and outside government, to send a strong signal to Afghan society of their determination to work together, regardless of ethnic background and political affiliation, to see the country through this very delicate phase of its history. And, in turn, we in the international community should send to the Afghan leadership and the Afghan population at large a strong signal that, at this critical juncture, we are equally determined to remain at their side.**

60. **Finally, I would like to once again commend the efforts of my Special Representative, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, and of his staff. The period since the last report has, as described above, been a period of instability in which the international community has been increasingly attacked. Their courage and forbearance under these conditions, and their ability to continue to work diligently and effectively despite these conditions, are commendable.**